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Research Summary
 
Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: 
12 month stage reports
By Paul Hickman, Kesia Reeve, Ian Wilson, Stephen Green, Chris Dayson and Peter Kemp
Background
Under current arrangements Housing Benefit 
(HB) is paid to the landlord rather than the tenant 
in the great majority of cases. However, along 
with five other social security benefits, HB is 
being incorporated into Universal Credit (UC). 
The housing component of UC is based on the 
present system of HB. However, because UC 
is paid as a single sum of money, the housing 
component by default will be paid to the tenant 
and not directly to the landlord. The Direct 
Payment Demonstration Projects (DPDPs) were 
established in six local authority areas in 2012 to 
test the direct payment of HB to tenants living in 
social housing. The projects were ‘live’ from 
June 2012 to December 2013. 
The Department commissioned the Centre for 
Regional Economic and Social Research at 
Sheffield Hallam University, in partnership with 
the University of Oxford and Ipsos MORI (IM), 
to monitor and evaluate the projects; in order to 
learn lessons from DPDP to provide feedback into 
the implementation of the projects and the design 
of Universal Credit. The evaluation began in 
November 2012 and will conclude later in 2014.
About the reports
By the end of the evaluation, the study team 
will have produced nine reports, in addition to 
five ‘learning reports’. Two reports have already 
been published. These focused on highlighting 
the findings to emerge from a baseline (first 
stage) survey of DPDP tenants and the key 
learning to emerge from the first six months 
of the programme being ‘live’. Three more 
reports, including the study’s final report, will be 
published later in 2014. 
This document summarises the key findings 
to emerge from a package of four reports: 
an overarching 12 month extended learning 
report, which summarises the main findings 
from all the strands of research and analysis 
at the 12 month stage; and three technical 
reports: rent ‘underpayment’ in DPDP; 
12 months’ Rent Account Analysis (RAA) 
exercise; and a stage 2 survey of tenants. 
It is important to note that the reports should 
be read alongside the others produced by the 
study team and that the DPDP programme 
was ongoing when data collection for them 
was undertaken. The key issues to emerge 
from the remainder of the programme, and the 
programme as a whole, will be highlighted in the 
evaluation’s final research outputs. 
Download this and other research reports free from  
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-work-pensions/ 
about/research#research-publications 
These reports draw on the following strands of 
the evaluation:
• RAA. This entailed analysis of the rent 
accounts of all those tenants who went onto 
direct payment during the first 12 months 
of the DPDP and the rent accounts of a 
comparator sample; 
• three surveys of tenants. The first one (the 
Baseline Survey) was conducted just before 
the introduction of direct payment and involved 
1,628 tenants being interviewed by IM. The 
second (Stage Two Survey), which was 
conducted between July and November 2013, 
involved 1,827 tenants being interviewed, 
1,218 of which were interviewed in the 
Baseline Survey. The study team has also 
undertaken a telephone survey of underpayers 
(i.e. those tenants who partially paid their rent). 
This involved a telephone survey of tenants 
who had been switched back to landlord 
payment on the two underpayment switchback 
triggers being interviewed in the autumn of 
2013; 
• qualitative activities. This encompassed a 
number of elements including: a longitudinal 
tenant panel (which comprised 48 tenants 
whose experiences have been tracked 
through the DPDP programme); a longitudinal 
stakeholder panel in each of the six Project 
Areas; focus groups; stakeholder events; and 
lender interviews. 
12 month extended learning report
Rent payment rates fell following the introduction 
of direct payment. As a result, rent arrears 
increased during the programme as did the 
number of tenants entering into arrears. 
However, payment patterns were found to 
improve significantly over time, reducing the 
impact of direct payment considerably by the 
end of the first 12 months. Notwithstanding this, 
much of the arrears accrued in the early stages 
of DPDP were not repaid and so total arrears 
continued to rise, albeit at a slower pace. 
The payment patterns that resulted in rent 
arrears were far more complex than anticipated, 
evading simple categorisations of ‘payers’ 
and ‘non-payers’. If it was this simple the ‘bad 
payers’ would quickly be removed from the 
system through the switchback process, or 
their characteristics could be examined so 
they could be targeted for preventative action 
or safeguarded altogether. But tenants who 
routinely pay their rent in full and on time can, 
unexpectedly, miss a payment one month and 
some of those who struggle when they first go 
onto direct payment subsequently manage well. 
It is, therefore, difficult to accurately forecast who 
will (or will not) manage on direct payment.
At the end of first year of DPDP in June 2013, 
the circumstances and characteristics which 
make tenants vulnerable to accruing arrears 
remained unclear. The assessment processes 
that were trialled to identify those ready for direct 
payments and those unlikely to manage without 
support were not effective. In order to target 
rent collection activity, minimise the financial risk 
associated with direct payment, and safeguard 
the most vulnerable tenants, landlords (and the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), in 
a UC context) need to be able to identify those 
tenants most at risk of accruing arrears and the 
factors driving underpayment. This is an area 
where further learning is needed.
Designing and initiating the DPDP programme 
took longer than anticipated, with challenges, 
problems and issues emerging on a regular 
basis. Given the scale and scope of UC, it 
is imperative that its timetable for roll-out 
acknowledges this and that time is factored into 
it for responding to unforeseen issues.
Key to the success of DPDP was the (local) 
relationship between the HB administrator 
(local authorities) and social housing landlords. 
Under UC, the challenge for DWP, which will be 
responsible for the administration of HB, and 
landlords will be (as far as is possible) replicating 
this relationship.
At the end of the first year of the programme, 
there was some evidence to suggest that direct 
payment was impacting on tenants’ attitudes 
and behaviour, although this is a preliminary 
finding. It was also impacting on the behaviour 
of landlords who were changing the way they 
operated, including introducing new ways of 
working and new roles and responsibilities for 
their staff; changing their organisational culture, 
in order to be more commercially oriented; and 
linked to this, in some cases, reviewing (and 
rethinking) their overall organisational objectives, 
goals and ethos. 
In addition to arrears, there are other costs 
associated with direct payment, specifically 
in relation to its delivery. However, although 
delivering direct payment was perceived to 
be considerably more resource intensive than 
landlord payment, at the end of the first year of 
the DPDP programme, landlords did not hold 
robust quantitative data to back up this assertion. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that cost 
savings may accrue from many of the direct 
payment triggered initiatives implemented 
by landlords, such as rent payment text 
reminders and improved rent collection and 
arrears IT systems. 
Stage 2 survey of tenants
Twenty-seven per cent of participants1 agreed, 
and 37 per cent disagreed, that taking part in 
the DPDP had made them better at managing 
their money. Whereas 60 per cent of participants 
disagreed, and 17 per cent agreed with the 
statement that taking part in the DPDP had 
made them less confident at managing their 
money. Sixty-eight per cent disagreed and three 
per cent agreed, that taking part in the DPDP 
had made them less likely to look for work. 
Thirty-six per cent of participants disagreed, 
and 25 per cent agreed, with the statement that 
taking part in the DPDP had made them more 
likely to hold down a job. About four out of ten 
1  ‘Participants’ were an amalgam of current 
participants and ex-participants.
current and ex-participants neither agreed nor 
disagreed. Whereas 49 per cent of participants 
disagreed, and 15 per cent agreed, with the 
statement that taking part in the DPDP had 
made them more likely to increase the hours 
they work. The responses of ex-participants to 
this statement were not significantly different 
from those of current participants.
Advice and support
Twenty per cent of current and 18 per cent of 
ex-participants had received advice or support 
while HB was being paid direct to them. Sixty-
eight per cent of participants who had received 
advice or support agreed that it had helped them 
to manage their rent payments; 16 per cent 
disagreed. Sixty-one per cent of participants 
who had received advice or support agreed 
that it had helped them to manage their 
money on a four-weekly or monthly basis; 
17 per cent disagreed.
Experience of direct payment
Two per cent of tenants in the stage 1 baseline 
survey reported that they were receiving HB 
direct; by the stage 2 follow-up survey, it had 
risen to 59 per cent. Among current participants 
on direct payment, 59 per cent said they had 
managed about the same as they had expected; 
19 per cent said they had managed better 
than expected and 22 per cent that they had 
managed worse than expected. Seventy-four 
per cent of current participants reported that 
they were coping well with direct payment and 
16 per cent that they were coping poorly.
Using bank accounts
Eighty-eight per cent of tenants in the stage 1 
baseline survey reported that they had a bank 
account; by the stage 2 follow-up survey, it had 
risen to 94 per cent. Fifteen per cent of tenants 
in the stage 2 survey who had a bank account 
reported being overdrawn. 
Rent arrears
Twenty per cent of tenants in the stage 1 
baseline survey reported that they were behind 
with their rent; by the stage 2 follow-up survey it 
was 30 per cent.
Among current participants who were already in 
arrears before the DPDP, 32 per cent reported 
that their arrears had increased, 34 per cent that 
the arrears had decreased, and 34 per cent that 
their arrears had stayed the same, since they 
joined the DPDP. Among ex-participants who 
were already in arrears before the DPDP, 
63 per cent reported that their arrears had 
increased, 27 per cent that the arrears had 
decreased, and 10 per cent that their arrears  
had stayed the same, since they joined the DPDP.
Tenants in arrears reported a wide range of ‘main 
reasons’ as to why they were behind with their 
rent. The most commonly cited were: problems 
with HB administration (20 per cent of tenants in 
arrears), low income (17 per cent), problems with 
HB being paid directly to me (13 per cent), and 
unexpected expenses (13 per cent).
Money management
At the stage 2 survey current participants (70 per 
cent) were significantly more likely than either 
ex-participants (64 per cent) or non-participants 
(61 per cent) to have a regular spending limit to 
help them manage their finances. The extent to 
which tenants managed to keep to their regular 
spending limit was no different at stage 2 from 
what it had been at the stage 1 baseline survey. 
In both surveys, about three-quarters of them 
reported that they were able to keep to their 
spending limit always or most of the time. In 
both the stage 1 baseline survey and the stage 
2 survey, 54 per cent of tenants reported that 
they had ‘often’ run out of money before the 
end of the week or month in the previous year. 
However, there was a decrease from 27 to 23 
per cent in the proportion who reported that they 
had ‘hardly ever’, and an increase from 19 to 24 
per cent in those who said they had ‘never’, run 
out of money.
Rent ‘underpayment’ in the Direct 
Payment Demonstration Projects
Patterns of underpayment 
There are four main types of underpayment: 
one-off underpayment; frequent erratic 
underpayment (i.e. where underpayments are 
made often but not usually consecutively); 
frequent persistent underpayment (i.e. 
where underpayments are made often and 
consecutively); and infrequent underpayment. 
Many tenants who underpaid did so on a regular 
basis. Nearly half of all underpayers could be 
classed as ‘regular’ underpayers in the sense 
that they underpaid more than three or four 
times (depending on how long they had been 
in receipt of direct payment). However, most 
underpayment was also ‘erratic’ (76 per cent of 
all underpayers could be classed as erratic) in 
the sense that tenants’ payment behaviour one 
month was not a good predictor of their payment 
behaviour going forward. Payment behaviour 
fluctuated, with tenants underpaying by different 
amounts and moving between underpayment, 
non-payment and full-payment over time. 
No underpayment group was associated with 
a particular amount of underpayment. In each 
underpayment group there were tenants who 
underpaid by a small amount and those who 
underpaid by a large amount. Just under one-
quarter of underpayers (19 per cent of all 
tenants who received seven or more direct 
payments of HB) could be classed as persistent 
underpayers in the sense that they made regular 
and consecutive underpayment. However, the 
amount by which tenants underpaid varied 
period on period. Underpayers and non-payers 
are not distinct groups. Non-payment is a feature 
of underpayers payment patterns. 
The impact of underpayment
Underpayment has a less significant impact on 
the total value of arrears than non-payment. 
Nevertheless, underpayment accounted for 
more than half of the total arrears accrued 
in the first 12 months of DPDP. Low value 
underpayment (less than 15 per cent of rent 
owed underpaid) has a limited impact on arrears, 
despite low value underpayers being the largest 
underpayment group in terms of percentage of 
rent underpaid. Frequent underpayers made 
a greater contribution to the overall value of 
arrears than infrequent or one-off underpayers. 
Nearly half of the total value of arrears was 
accrued by frequent persistent underpayers. 
Arrears arising from underpayment compounded 
tenants’ debt problems – 44 per cent had 
existing debts or rent arrears – and put some 
tenants in arrears whose rent accounts had 
previously balanced. Tenants also reported an 
emotional impact of underpaying, frequently 
expressing feelings of guilt, shame and 
embarrassment. 
Understanding underpayment 
Analysis of data garnered from a telephone 
survey and in-depth interviews with one key 
underpayer sub-group – tenants who switched 
back under the underpayment switchback 
triggers, 3 and 4 – and RAA, provides an insight 
into how and why underpayment occurs and who 
underpays. It appears that a bundle of factors 
contribute to underpayment. These include: the 
socio-demographic characteristics of tenants; 
the vulnerability of tenants and the complexity 
of their lives; tenants’ financial circumstances; 
poor money management; tenants’ attitudes to 
spending and saving; the prioritisation of other 
bills over rent; confusion about direct payment, 
HB monies and rent. 
12 months’ rent account 
analysis exercise
Receiving direct payment of HB was found 
to reduce the average amount of rent which 
tenants paid each payment period by 6.6 per 
cent2. However, the impact of direct payments 
lessened significantly over time. There was 
a marked reduction in rent payments rates in 
payment period 1, when tenants received their 
first direct payment of HB, but by payment period 
8 average rent payment rates reached parity with 
a comparator sample of tenants3. The impact 
of direct payments on arrears fell from a high 
of 15.8 per cent less rent paid (i.e. than would 
have been paid had direct payments not been 
introduced) in the first three payment periods on 
direct payment to an average of 1.2 per cent less 
rent paid in payment periods 10 to 12. 
Being on direct payment was found to increase 
the likelihood of tenants falling into arrears, 
particularly in the first few months, after which 
the likelihood of accruing arrears lessened 
markedly. In total, 61 per cent of direct payment 
tenants (i.e. those who were put onto direct 
payment at some point during the DPDP) 
accrued arrears, compared with 35 per cent of 
a comparator sample. Overall, being on direct 
payments was found to increase the likelihood 
of a tenant accruing arrears by 11 per cent 
(compared to if they had not been on direct 
payment). However, the situation improved 
markedly over time.
2 The impact of direct payment on rent payment rates 
was assessed using statistical modelling techniques 
and a comparator sample. The ‘rent payment rate’ 
is not the same as the ‘arrears rate’, although a 
reduction in rent payment rates will often result in 
increased arrears. For example, if a tenant has been 
overpaying their rent for several months and is in 
credit on their rent account and then underpay for a 
period of time until their rent account balances, their 
‘rent payment rate’ would have reduced but they 
would not have accrued arrears.
3 None of whom were in receipt of direct payment.
Underpayment was much more common than 
non-payment in the sense that more tenants 
underpaid than did not pay at all. However, 
non-payment had a greater impact on the total 
value of arrears than underpayment. ‘Persistent’ 
underpayment was relatively common but 
tended to involve small amounts. 
The majority of the ‘best payers’ (i.e. tenants who 
paid all their rent while on direct payments), paid 
their rent late at some point. Late payment has 
an impact on landlord cash flow. However, DPDP 
tenant payment patterns did not differ markedly 
from the comparator sample suggesting that 
late payment is an issue that transcends, and 
precedes the introduction of direct payment. In 
total, 80 per cent of tenants who paid all their 
rent while on direct payments made at least one 
late payment, compared with 71 per cent of the 
comparator sample.
The payment behaviour of tenants who initially 
failed to pay some or all of their rent quickly 
improved. Payment rates amongst this group 
soon mirrored average payment rates across 
the full sample of direct payment recipients 
(i.e. including those who paid all their rent). 
However, much of the early arrears they accrued 
were not repaid. The shift to direct payment, 
therefore, represented a negative step-change 
in the overall rent account balances for those 
who accrued arrears in the first three payment 
periods. Seventy-nine per cent of tenants who 
accrued arrears during the first three direct 
payment periods were still in arrears in the final 
period and, amongst tenants who remained on 
direct payment (i.e. did not revert back to having 
their rent paid direct to the landlord, as some 
tenants who accrued arrears did under agreed 
protocols) the value of arrears had not reduced.
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